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English fertility history is generally regarded as having been composed of two re-
gimes: an era of unregulated marital fertility, from at least 1540 to 1890, then the 
modern era, with regulated marital fertility, lower for higher social classes.  We show 
there were in fact three fertility regimes in England: a Malthusian regime which lasted 
from at least 1500 until 1780, where fertility was substantially higher for the rich, an 
intermediate regime from 1780 to 1890 with fertility undifferentiated by class, and fi-
nally the modern regime.  Wealthy English men produced substantially fewer child-
ren within a generation of the onset of the Industrial Revolution, over 100 years 
before the classic demographic transition.  At the same time the fertility of the poor 
increased.  Determining what triggered this change, however, and why it coincided 
with the Industrial Revolution, will require further research. 
 
 
 Two events created the modern economic world: the Industrial Revolution and the Demo-
graphic Transition.  The Industrial Revolution increased the growth rate of output through a stream 
of innovations.  But as important was the Demographic Transition.  Before 1800 there was some 
technological advance: though slow and spasmodic.  But all technological advance was absorbed in 
raising the stock of people, not in raising living standards.  Since the rich had more children than the 
poor, any rise in living standards induced population growth.  Technological gains were consumed in 
maintaining ever larger populations.  Only with the Demographic Transition did population gains 
stop absorbing much of the technological advance, allowing rapid gains in living standards. 
 
 In England, however, the Industrial Revolution dates to 1760-1800, while the Demographic 
Transition occurred around 1890.  There is a 110 year gap between these two events.  Figure 1, for 
example, shows the number of surviving children per woman in England by decade from the 1540s 
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to the 1910s.  Only in the late nineteenth century is there sign of a decline in net fertility.  The 
Industrial Revolution itself is indeed associated with unprecedentedly fast population growth in 
England.  These gross facts of population have led historians and demographers to focus on 1890 as 
the key and only break in English demographic history.  They have also created a problem for 
theories which seek to explain modern growth through a shift from child quantity to child quality.1  
The arrival of rapid and sustained technological advance clearly long preceded the Demographic 
Transition.  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
 Here we show that, starting with the generation marrying in the 1760s, there were in fact 
significant declines in net fertility in Industrial Revolution England, but only among wealthy men.  
Rich men switched from a net fertility of above 4 children, to one of 3 or less, no different than the 
general population.  This large change in behavior does not show in the aggregate English data 
because at the same time the net fertility of poorer groups, the bulk of the society, increased to equal 
that of the rich.  Thus by the time of the onset second fertility transition in 1880-1910 the net 
fertility of the poor was, if anything, higher than for the rich.   
 
 The limited and contradictory earlier evidence on the relationship between wealth and fertility 
in pre-industrial England, and the fact that marriage ages and nuptuality were seemingly similar in 
1850 to their earlier levels of many decades, created a false impression that the fertility regime of the 
mid nineteenth century represented the entire pre-industrial period.2  In fact it was a regime of no 
more than 100 years.  Despite many years of research into the demography of pre-industrial England 
we seem to have missed an earlier substantial transformation in the demographic system that 
accompanied the Industrial Revolution. 
  
                                                          
1 Becker, Gary, Kevin Murphy, and Robert Tamura, 1990, Galor and Weil, 2000, Galor and Moav, 2002, 
Hansen and Prescott, 2002, Lucas, 2002. 
2 Hollingsworth showed that from 1350-1729 the net fertility of the richest of the English, ducal families, was 
generally below the average for England (Hollingsworth, 1965).  In contrast in seventeenth century London 
infant death rates were higher in poorer parishes (Landers, 1993, 186-88).  And studies of a parish in Lanca-
shire (Hughes, 1986), and another in Cumbria (Scott and Duncan, 2000), correctly identified a positive 
relationship between both gross and net fertility and wealth in 1600-1800.   
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The Method 
 
 We know a lot about aggregates levels of gross and net fertility in England from 1540 onwards: 
from parish records until 1837, then from civil birth, death and marriage registration.  Parish records 
however, in most cases, reveal little of the wealth and income of parents.  Thus demographers have 
accumulated little information on fertility in England as a function of income or wealth before 1850. 
 
 This means the earliest systematic evidence on differences in fertility by economic status in 
England comes only with a report associated with the 1911 census that correlated fertility with 
occupational status for marriages formed from 1851 onwards.  By then wealthier groups had net 
fertilities no higher than those of the poor.  Figure 2 shows what this 1911 report suggests.  It shows 
net fertility for marriages of 25 or more years duration by social class, where the lower numbers are 
higher classes, by marriage cohort starting in 1851-60.  1851-1871 there was little or no difference in 
fertility by social class, with the net fertility of all these groups relatively high.   
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
 To detect the links between wealth or status and net fertility before 1840 we have to turn to 
another source, men’s wills.  There are millions of extant wills in England for the years after 1400, 
and a significant fraction has been transcribed or abstracted.  Men only are used since before the 
Married Women’s Property Act of 1882 married women had limited claims on marital property, and 
typically left wills only if widowed.  Using men’s wills to estimate wealth and numbers of surviving 
children, Clark and Gillian Hamilton show that, unlike in 1851, there was a strong positive associa-
tion between wealth and net fertility 1580-1640 (Clark and Hamilton, 2006, Clark, 2007).  Sometime 
between 1640 and 1851 there was a substantial decline in the fertility of the rich, and rise in the 
fertility of the poorer.  Here we seek to determine when that change occurred, and also how far back 
before 1580 the 1580-1640 pattern extended.  
 
 To measure the connection between wealth and fertility over the long run in England we have 
assembled here a data sample from more than 14,000 wills from 1500 to 1914.  The wills we employ 
are mainly sampled from three counties – Surrey (48%), Essex (24%), Suffolk (22%) – but with 
numbers of wills also from the adjacent counties of Middlesex (1%), Kent (1%) and Cambridge 
(1%).  The geographic scope of our sample is shown in figure 3.  The wills are thus sampled from a 
diverse area of southern England which includes rural areas, medium sized towns such as Ipswich 
and Colchester, and London itself in the form of Southwark.  The sample before 1860 was largely 
determined by the availability of abstracts of the original wills. 
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FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
 Wills in England before 1858 were proved in ecclesiastical courts.  Our will abstracts are largely 
from the lower levels of these courts which included the poorest testators.  But we have 1,124 wills 
from the highest court, the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, which dealt with the wills of the richest 
testators. After 1858 the wills come from the records of the Principal Probate Registry in London 
which preserved all probated wills in England since 1858.  These PPR wills we have taken mainly 
from Essex and Suffolk.   
 
 In pre-industrial England a surprisingly large fraction of men left probated wills.  Figure 4 
shows for Suffolk the ratio of all extant probated wills of men to the estimated numbers of deaths of 
men aged 25 and above, 1500-1702.  In some decades more than 40 percent of men dying in that 
decade left a surviving probated will.  Thus though wills were more frequent among the wealthy, 
there are plenty that come from the middle and even the lower ranks of men in terms of wealth and 
social position in pre-industrial England.  Later wills were made by a smaller fraction of men.  By 
1861 only 12 percent of adult men in England left a probated will.3  Wills thus cover a wide spec-
trum of men in pre-industrial England, but a more exclusive spectrum of the population later. 
 
FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
 The numbers of surviving children for each testator were estimated from the wills in three 
ways.   
(1) First there are wills where all the children were seemingly recorded.  Here we counted dead 
children who had produced living grandchildren as “surviving” children also.   
(2) Next there were wills earlier in the sixteenth century where girls tended to be omitted.  Table 
A.2 in the appendix shows for the countryside, towns and London by period the observed 
average number of sons and daughters.  There tends to be an equality of sons and daughters 
in towns, a surplus of daughters in London, and a deficit of daughters in the countryside 
across all periods.  This may be a consequence of different mortality regimes.  But in wills 
before 1580 we observe in both the countryside and in towns a shortage of girls compared 
to later.  This probably stems from testators of these years not listing their married daugh-
ters, who were regarded as having received their bequests already in the form of their dowry.  
We corrected this omission by multiplying girls in wills in the countryside by 1.33 (1500-49), 
                                                          
3 Assuming that 60 percent of male deaths in 1861 were for men aged 21 or above. 
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1.16 (1550-79), and girls in the towns by 1.53 (1500-49).  This brings the ratios in these 
groups to their 1600-99 levels. 
(3) Finally there are wills where besides the children specified, there were also indications of an 
unspecified number of additional children.  Where we could determine in a will that the 
number of children was “≥ n” we estimated the expected number of children from the aver-
age of wills in this category (see appendix table A.2).    
 
 Estimating net fertility from wills will always tend to produce a lower bound estimate, since the 
errors will typically be the omission of some children.  But the wills show relative net fertility levels 
by asset wealth, by socio-economic status, and over time. 
 
 For wills after 1841 we are also able to link many testators to individual census records from 
1841 on giving the age of the testator at the writing of the will and at death.  For the earlier wills we 
can get the age at death for a subset of more than 2,000 testators from parish records giving bapt-
isms and marriages.4  For those testators where we do not have a direct estimate of age at death we 
can infer this from the observed features of the testator: their marital status, numbers of children 
reported in the will, numbers of grandchildren, whether one of their parents is alive, and whether 
they have a child aged 21 or above, whether they report a nephew or niece, whether they report 
siblings, and whether they describe themselves as “aged” or “ancient.”  The appendix reports the 
various methods used to fill in missing values for testators.  The regression used to predict age has 
an R2 of 0.52.  Thus we are able to form cohorts of male testators alternatively by birth year and 
marriage year. 
 
 The wealth of testators was estimated from the wills in a variety of ways.  The best estimate 
conceptually is that where we have both details of real estate, including land areas, from the will, and 
the value of the “personalty ” – assets other than real estate – from the court records, or after 1780 
from estate tax declarations.  In 3,520 out of 14,665 wills with wealth information we have such data 
(24 percent).  The major flaws with using probate valuations as true measures of wealth other than 
real estate are the omissions of settled property (before 1898), and of debts and credits (Owens, 
Green, Bailey, and Kay, 2006, 383-384, Rubinstein 1977, 100). However for most of the testators in 
the range of wealth and social position that constitutes our sample, settled estates were not an issue.  
Where we only have the "gross" probate value, debts owed or credits due to the deceased are 
omitted. But for the period after 1881, Rubenstein estimates that the difference between the gross 
                                                          
4 See appendix table 3.  For about half these cases we only get the date of first marriage, or the date of the 
first child born.  But we can use this information to estimate a birth date for the testator from the fact that 
the average age at first marriage was 28, and the average age at first birth 29.1.   
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and net value of an estate, was on average only 5 to 15% (Owens et al 2006, 387).   Where the duty 
value is used as an estimation of the probate value there is also an inflation of probate values for two 
reasons.  Here the executors of the wills submitted estimates, and because of a fine for undervalua-
tion it is believed that valuation was likely to be an overestimate of a testator’s worth.  Also before 
1881, effects are reported as an approximation, under a certain set threshold level (e.g. under £50, 
under £100), which further inflates the average reported value (Owens et al. 2006, 386-387).  We 
control for these various biases in the regressions described in the appendix which estimate total 
wealth.  
 
 In a second class of wills, we have information on real estate, but not land areas.  Thus in 71 
percent of the wills with land we have to infer the area.  But we are able to approximate well the 
land area where it is omitted from other details of the will such as the testator’s occupation and cash 
bequests.  The R2 is 0.38.  Table A5 in the appendix details how the area of land bequeathed was 
estimated in the remaining 71 percent of cases. 
 
 For many wills before 1780 we do not have the probate value.  This we approximate from the 
total value of money and goods bequeathed by the testator, using also information from other 
characteristics of the testator.  As the appendix shows this correlates well with the net probate value.  
These first three groups of wills give us the assets for 88 percent of testators. 
 
 Finally there is a group of 12 percent of the wills where we have the duty value, or probate 
value, but no direct information on even whether or not there is real estate.  These cases typically 
arise because a man leaves all his possessions to his wife.  In these cases we have to impute the value 
of real estate.  This we do in a two stage process.  First we estimate whether there was likely to be 
any real estate, using a logit regression on the cases where we have both real estate data and probate 
values.  It turns out to be very hard to know whether someone has real estate or not from the other 
characteristics.  The pseudo R2 of this regression is very low (see table A.7).  But once we attribute 
real estate to someone, estimating its likely value can be done more successfully (table A.8). 
 
 One test of our ability to attribute wealth elements is whether the resulting estimates correlate 
in the same way with other observable elements such as occupation or status.  Table A.11 shows 
that the wills with the various kinds of attributed wealth show overall the same relationship of 
wealth to status as in wills with complete information. 
 
 In the course of the years 1500-1914 the real rate of return on assets in England declined 
significantly.  The annual real purchasing power associated with a £1 of assets thus declined signifi-
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cantly over time as interest rates fell.  We thus calculated an expected “bequest income stream” for 
each testator over time as a better way of quantifying the average value of bequests over time. 
 
 Table 1 summarizes by period the numbers of men for which we have information on assets at 
death and numbers of surviving children by half century death cohorts.  We have over 14,000 wills 
coded so far, with typically more than 400 per decade for men dying between between 1700 and 
1860. 
  
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
 We also coded the occupations of the testators into 7 socio-economic status categories.  These 
differ from the more modern socio-economic status classification because of the prevalence in 
status descriptions on wills even as late as the late nineteenth century of such terms as “yeoman,” 
“husbandman” and “gentleman.”  But they do seem to capture socio-economic differences.  Table 2 
shows for men dying before 1800 by socio-economic status average assets, the percent literate (as 
revealed by a signed will), and average estimated age at death.  Average assets and literacy were 
strongly correlated with the assigned socio-economic status.  And there was also some correlation of 
the estimated age of death, with gentry testators on average dying nearly 5 years later than laborers. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 Table 3 shows similar correlates of socio-economic status with assets and average age at death 
for men dying after 1800.  Again socio-economic status correlates strongly with average assets, and 
literacy, and is also correlated with average age at death.  But there has been substantial increase in 
average literacy rates, average age at death, and also average assets.  Now the average age of death 
for the gentry is 67.4, as opposed to 56.7 for those dying before 1800.  Age at death also increase for 
laborers: from 52.1 years to 64.5.  But the gentry still lived on average 3 years longer. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 In addition to numbers of children and wealth wills reveal the literacy of testators, and their 
residence.  Literacy is inferred where the testator signed the will, or where they left books as posses-
sions.  Testators who signed the will with an “x” are adjudged illiterate.  Wills record where the 
person making the will was living.  We have grouped these locations into London, towns including 
London, and the countryside.  In addition, we have classified testators as living on farms where their 
occupation was given as farming, or where they left grain or livestock as bequests. 
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A First Demographic Revolution, 1780? 
 
 Having derived measures of wealth at death, and of net fertility, for our database of testators, 
we can immediately show that a striking change in demographic behavior occurred for men some-
time around 1800.  Figure 5 shows for men ever married dying before 1830, and 1830 and later, by 
asset income deciles (defined over the whole sample), the numbers of surviving children identified 
from their wills, controlling for their location in London, town, countryside or on a farm.5  The split 
in terms of the decade of marriage is roughly for men marrying before 1800 and after 1800. 
 
 For the ever married male testators in the earlier group there is a clear and very powerful 
association of wealth and net fertility.  The men in the richest decile have an average of 4.2 surviving 
children, while those in the lowest decile have only 2.4 surviving children.  For those marrying after 
1800 this powerful wealth effect completely disappears.  The numbers of surviving children per man 
averages 3.2 independent of their wealth decile.  Thus for marriages after 1800 for rich men there 
was a decline in net fertility of a full child.  While for the poorest testators there was a gain of nearly 
0.8 children per man.   
 
FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
 Figure 6 shows median real wealth by age for men dying before and after 1830.  In both periods 
men seem to accumulate wealth over their lifetimes from the 20s to the 60s, after which wealth stays 
relatively constant.  Might this association be the source of the patterns shown in figure 5.  That is 
might the causal structure be as follows, with wealth and fertility only appearing to be causally 
linked? 
 
 
                                                          
5 The will sample fails to identify some widowers, since if they have no surviving children or grandchildren, 
and fail to mention their deceased wife or her relatives in the will, they will be classified as single.  However, 
the number of such omissions should be constant over time. 
fertility
age
wealth
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Three considerations show age cannot be the source of the positive wealth-fertility association 
before 1830.  First the wealth is more strongly associated with age for deaths 1830 and later, when 
the wealth/fertility association disappears.  Second if wealth is just standing as a noisy proxy for age, 
then the strength of the age/wealth association has to be at least as strong as that between wealth 
and fertility.  But wealth is a much more powerful predictor of fertility than age is a predictor of 
wealth.6  Lastly we can run an estimation of net fertility on wealth, controlling for the estimated age 
of the will maker, and the wealth effect is little diminished.  It falls from a 75 percent premium in 
fertility for the tenth wealth decile compared to the first decile for ever married men, to a 60 percent 
premium once we control for age at death.  But since age here is partly estimated through numbers 
of surviving children, and since one of the reasons for higher fertility with wealth will be lower 
mortality rates among the wealthier, we are definitely over-controlling for any spurious age effect 
here.  
  
FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
 How abrupt was this Industrial Revolution change in fertility regimes?  Figure 7 shows by 
twenty year probate periods the numbers of surviving children for men ever married, residing 
outside London, according to their asset income tercile over the whole period.  Thus in each period 
the poorest group are those with an implied asset income below £5.4 per year (in 1630s prices), the 
richest are those with implied asset incomes above £15.9.  A craftsman’s wage income in the 1630s 
in England would be about £15 per year, so the poorest group derive very little income from their 
assets, and live mainly on their labor income.  The poorest group, those closest to the average 
person in the population in England, show a fairly constant net fertility over the entire span 1500-
1914, but with a modest increase of about 0.4 children per year after 1800 compared to their earlier 
average.  The richest testators show an opposing decline in net fertility.  The combined effects of 
these movements is that the persistent net fertility advantage of the richest compared to the poorest 
testators, which is evident for 300 years before 1800, has disappeared by the cohort of wills probated 
in the 1840s and 1850s.    
 
FIGURE 7 HERE 
  
 The cohort of men whose wills were probated in 1840-59, however, will potentially contain 
men born as early as 1740, and as late as 1840.  Thus the periods when these men married and had 
                                                          
6 The R2 of the relationship between wealth and fertility is several times higher than that between age and 
fertility. 
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children would vary widely.  To look more sharply into when this change in net fertility by wealth 
changed took place we group our testators into marriage cohorts of 1500-19, 1520-39, …, 1860-79.  
For each man a date of marriage was assigned as follows.  First the date of marriage from parish or 
civil registration records, if that was available.  Failing that an attributed date of marriage 1.1 years 
before the date of birth of the first child from parish or civil records.  Failing that the date of 
marriage was taken as the estimated date of birth, using the method outlined in the appendix, plus 
28 years.  
 
 A problem with these marriage cohorts is that, for reasons of record availability, we have 
unbalanced death cohorts.  For married or widowed men outside London, for example, we have 
1,243 observations for the 1630s, and 157 for the 1640s.  This will lead to the marriage cohorts 
having an unbalanced age structure.  Some will have too many older men, some too many younger 
men.  To correct this we calculate net fertility by marriage cohort, reweighting by the inverse of the 
sizes of the probate cohorts who contributed observations to each marriage cohort.  Figure 8 shows 
these results.   This has the effect of smoothing the fluctuations between periods of numbers of 
surviving children per man.  
 
FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
 Figure 9 shows the difference in numbers of surviving children between the top and bottom 
terciles by marriage cohort.  This brings into sharp relief the timing of the disappearance of wealth 
differentiated fertility.  By marriages formed 1800 and later the positive association of fertility and 
wealth has gone.  The decline of the difference appears to proceed relatively quickly starting with the 
cohorts marrying in 1760.  Table 4 shows the estimated difference between the fertility of the richest 
versus the poorest tercile by 20 year marriage cohorts for each period 1500-19 to 1860-79, control-
ling for testators located in London, in towns in general, and on farms.  Since these are the coeffi-
cients from a negative binomial regression they show approximately the fractional amount by which 
net fertility of the top tercile exceeded that of the lowest tercile.  Also shown are the standard errors 
of the estimate.  After 1800 there is no longer ever any significant difference between the top and 
bottom terciles.   
 
FIGURE 9 HERE 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
The decline in the gap is a result of both the top tercile reducing its net fertility and the bottom 
tercile increasing its fertility.  Thus at the same time as fertility as a whole began to rise in England in 
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the Industrial Revolution era, the net fertility of the rich declined substantially.  England experienced 
not one but two changes in demographic regime as modern growth commenced.  The first change, 
which saw increased net fertility by poorer families, along with declining fertility by the rich, led to a 
general population boom.  Only 120 years later did the rich experience a further decline in fertility to 
levels below those of the poor. 
 
 Another important source of differences in fertility over time in the pre-industrial world in 
Wrigley and Schofield (1989) is a change in the percent of women who remain unmarried.  Here we 
have the numbers only on men, but it is interesting to ask whether the close wealth-fertility connec-
tion would be weakened if we took wealth differences in nuptuality into effect.  Figure 10 shows by 
wealth deciles the fraction of men dying without indication that they were ever married, for men 
dying before 1830, and dying 1830-59.7  As noted this will be higher than the true percent never 
married, because men widowed without surviving children may not indicate by their wills that they 
were ever married. 
  
FIGURE 10 HERE 
 
 What we see here is that for both groups of men there is a strong negative association between 
wealth and the changes of being never married at death.  Whereas only about 12 percent of the 
richest men are recorded as never married, this rises to about 20 percent for the poorest men.  So 
nuptuality rates reinforce the pattern of fertility advantage within marriage for richer men.  In 1830-
59 nuptuality patterns would also imply a modest advantage in the fertility of richer men.  But we do 
not know if this continues for deaths post 1860.  
 
 We have examined fertility here by asset income terciles, defined across the whole sample of 
probates 1500-1914.   Thus the line for the third tercile in figure 8 plots, for example, the mean 
fertility by 20 year marriage cohorts, of men with assets that generated an expected income of more 
than £15.9.  However, the median asset income of testators changed substantially over time.  As 
table 1 shows for those probated in 1500-49 it was (in £ 1630), £3.6, while by 1750-99 it has risen to 
£12.4.  Partly this may be a result of the decline over time in the numbers of men leaving wills, if 
only the wealthier later were tending to leave wills.  Figure 11 shows the share of testators by 
marriage cohorts in each wealth tercile from 1500 to 1880.  From 1500 to 1800 there is a steady rise 
                                                          
7 For men dying 1860-1914 the sample over weights married men, since initially we were concerned to 
sample only those whose age could be obtained from the censuses of 1841 and later. 
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in the share in the top tercile, and decline in the share in the bottom tercile.  Thus the wealth of our 
top tercile, relative to median wealth, is much greater in 1500-19 than in 1780-99.   
 
FIGURE 11 HERE 
 
 The long run increase in median wealth of will makers raises an interesting issue.  For marriages 
before 1800 was net fertility determined by absolute wealth, or by relative wealth?  Was it just that 
the relatively more successful men economically in each period were also successful in securing 
reproduction through securing more fertile wives, or did absolute levels of wealth confer reproduc-
tive advantage?  To test the relative importance of absolute versus relative wealth we estimated the 
coefficients of the following regression for men residing outside London: 
 
ܥܪܫܮܦܴܧܰ  ൌ  ܽ଴ ൅෍ܽ௜
ଵ଴
௜ୀଶ
ܣܤܵܦܧܥܫܮܧ௜ ൅ ෍ ௝ܾ
ଵ଴
௝ୀଶ
ܴܧܮܦܧܥܫܮܧ௝ ൅ ܿଵܦܱܹܶܰ൅ ܿଶܦܨܣܴܯ 
 
where ABSDECILE are a series of 9 indicator variables for the position of the testator in the overall 
wealth decile for the sample of men as a whole, and RELDECILE a series of 9 indicator variables 
for their position in the wealth decile of the 5 decades that precede and include their probate decade.  
Figure 12 shows the estimated coefficients translated into percentage increases or decreases over the 
baseline level.  They show, relative to being in the both the first absolute and relative wealth decile, 
what net fertility is in each of 99 combinations of other possible positions in absolute and relative 
wealth deciles, measured as the percentage gain or loss over this baseline.  Thus the richest men, 
those in the tenth absolute and relative deciles, had a fertility level 78 percent higher than the 
baseline first decile: a product of the 52 percent advantage from their absolute position, plus a 17 
percent gain from their relative position.  These effect estimates suggests that absolute wealth 
dominates in the determination of fertility as opposed to relative wealth, though relative wealth also 
matters.  Wealth alone, rather than relative social position, is the major determinant of fertility in 
England for men marrying before 1800. 
 
FIGURE 12 HERE 
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Explaining the Demographic Revolution of 1780 
 
 What drove the profound change in net fertility differences by wealth class that coincided with 
the Industrial Revolution?  England witnessed significant social changes in the Industrial Revolution 
era.  There were significant shifts in occupations, in residence, and in literacy.  However it is a simple 
matter to show that none of these factors can account for the observed changes in the behavior of 
both the rich and the poor.  The first problem with any of these as the driving force is that the social 
and economic changes in England in the Industrial Revolution era were gradual in comparison to 
the changes in demography described above between 1760 and 1800.  Literacy increased, but very 
gradually all the way from 1560 to 1900 (Clark, 2007, 179).  The percentage of people in towns, and 
the percentage in non-farm occupations again all increased gradually between 1500 and 1900.  But 
the fertility revolution we observe was largely complete within 40 years. 
 
 The second problem is that when we try and explain net fertility using occupation and literacy 
we find that for marriages before 1800 they are all very weakly connected to fertility, once we 
control for wealth effects.  They thus cannot explain secular changes in net fertility in any stable 
fashion.  To see this consider the regression coefficients reported in Table 5.  This is a negative 
binomial regression with the dependant variable the number of surviving children, and the indepen-
dent variables including a dummy for each time period, for each wealth decile, for each of seven 
social classes, for literacy, and for town, London, and farm locations, for marriage cohorts 1500-
1799 and 1800-1879.  The coefficients again roughly indicate the percentage increase or decrease in 
net fertility from a given characteristic.  The strong association between wealth and fertility survives 
even when we include measures of social and occupational status, and literacy.  Controlling for 
wealth, literacy has no effect on net fertility, and the effects of occupations, while sometimes 
statistically significant, are all of modest size.  The switch, for example, of the rich from farming to 
urban occupations explains little of the decline in fertility among that group.  And the switch away 
from farming cannot explain the rise in net fertility amongst the poorer men. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
 Another potential explanation of a decline in net fertility 1760-1800 among high income groups 
is a general decline in mortality.  For the testators with observed ages we see a substantial increase 
between 1500 and 1914 in the average age of death.  The average age of testators, reported in table 
1, rose from 52 in 1500-1549 to 66 by 1850-1914.  We also observe in tables 2 and 3 that rich men 
had higher live expectancies than poorer men.  Suppose men in pre-industrial England men wanted 
as many children as possible in order to maximize the chance of having at least one heir.  The 
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hazards of survival meant that even with relatively high net fertility rates a substantial fraction of 
men would die with no child to inherit.  Suppose the rich consequently had “surplus” children to 
maximize that survivor probability.  Increased chance of survival of children to age 30 or so, the 
typical age of children at men’s death, might lead richer men, with better child survival, to have a 
reduced need for “surplus” children as insurance, leading to their declining net fertility.  
 
 Figure 13 shows a simple test of this possibility.  It shows first for marriage cohorts before 1800 
the chance of an ever married man dying without an heir as a function of their (absolute) wealth 
decile.8  Even among the richest men there was a 12 percent of dying without an heir.  Their 
chances of dying childless were, however, significantly lower than for the poorest men.  However, 
for the richest men marrying 1800-1879 the chances of dying childless rose significantly.  For the top 
decile it became 21 percent, nearly twice as high as before.  It is not possible to interpret the onset of 
declining net fertility in the rich as coming from any better ability to target completed family sizes.9 
 
FIGURE 13 HERE 
 
 
Further Work 
 
 A powerful idea among economists has been that a greater role of human capital in generating 
income lead to the modern fertility decline.10  The key idea in this literature is that in the modern 
world there is a higher cost in terms of the income and consumption of each child from larger 
family sizes.  Is there any sign that after 1760 the costs of having children increased for the rich, but 
decreased for the poor?  This seems unlikely.  For a start, the wealthy in pre-industrial England 
whose income depended largely on the possession of land or houses always had a strong incentive to 
limit fertility if they wanted to maintain the living standards of their children.  The family assets 
would get divided up among the children, so that with more than two children average expected 
assets per child would decline.11  In a world post 1800 where education was the key to income, since 
                                                          
8 Controlling for location. 
9 Clark and Cummins, 2009, gives further evidence against this possibility, through an examination of the 
fertility patterns of men in different mortality environments in pre-industrial England.  The countryside was 
so much safer than London that if reduced mortality risks were to lead to declining fertility, it should already 
have happened in the most rural locations even before 1800. 
10 See, for example, Lucas, 2002, Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 1990.  
11 Spouses would also bring assets to marriages, so that a child with half the assets of a parent would on 
average end up in a family with assets equal to that of the parental family. 
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there was a maximum cost of education, the richest could afford to have as many children as they 
wanted, and still give them all the maximum possible amount of education.   
 
 One test of this possibility, though it depends on obtaining more data than we have at present, 
is to look at the connection between the wealth of fathers and sons in our will sample.   Fathers can 
be conceived of influencing the wealth of sons through two channels.  The first is through mechan-
isms such as genes, culture, and social position that are independent of the number of children.  The 
expected wealth of the child through this channel will be some function of the wealth of the father, 
Wf.  The second mechanism is through the transfer of wealth and resources such as training time 
and formal education from father to son.  The influence here will depend on the numbers of 
children sharing the resources of the father.  The wealth of children will be a function of Wf/N, 
where N is the number of children (assuming daughters inherit as much as sons).  The relative 
magnitude of effects through this channel compared with the unlimited transfer will dictate how 
strong the quality-quantity tradeoff is. 
 
The basic estimating equation is thus 
 
݈݊ሺ ௦ܹሻ ൌ   ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ݈݊൫ ௙ܹ൯ ൅ ܾଶ݈݊ ൬ ௙ܹܰ ൰ 
 
With this formulation, the estimated coefficient –b2 is the elasticity of son’s asset income as a 
function of the father’s number of surviving children.  The coefficient b1 shows the direct link 
between fathers’ and sons’ wealth, independent of the size of the fathers’ family.  The sum of the 
coefficients, b1 + b2 , is the total elasticity of sons’ wealth with respect to fathers.  If family size fell 
among the rich, and rose among the poorer, after 1760 as a result of changes in the strength of the 
tradeoff between quantity and quality then we would expect the following values for the estimated 
coefficient b2: 
 
 Rich Poor 
1500-1780 <b >b 
1780-1914 b =b 
 
 That is, compared to the value of b2 for the rich after 1780, the value for the rich before should 
have been lower, and for the poor higher.  After 1780 since the rich and poor had the same family 
size then the quality/quantity tradeoff should have been the same for them.  We are at work on 
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accumulating sufficient number of father son pairs of the various types and periods to conduct this 
test. 
 
 The surprisingly sudden change in the pattern of fertility with wealth makes it hard to explain 
through economic variables which were all changing only slowly in England in these years, even 
though it is the period of the Industrial Revolution.  This suggests an alternative explanation in the 
form of some social or ideological movement.  One possibility, for example, is that the decline in 
fertility among the rich was a reaction among the economically successful to the widespread publici-
ty afforded Thomas Malthus’s Essay on a Principle of Population, first published 1798, but re-issued in 
five revised editions until the author’s death in 1834.  We would expect, however, such a social or 
intellectual movement to be associated with occupations or professions more than with incomes.  
Such an explanation would imply conscious control of fertility by richer men in marriages formed 
1780 and later.  This control could take the form of marrying older women.  For the men that we 
successfully linked to parish records we do note that in general testators marry women 2.5 years 
younger than in the general population in the seventeenth century, but 0.9 years older by 1800-37 
(table A.4).  This would account for considerable fertility differences.  But to investigate this syste-
matically, and to show that it was a change of behavior specifically among richer testators, we need 
to link many more testators to parish records, which we are in the process of doing.  Also from 
records of baptisms and births we can determine whether birth intervals increased for the rich after 
1780, or whether there is sign of stopping behaviors. 
 
 A further feature of our data that shows in figures 8 and 9 is that the gap between the fertility of 
richer and poorer men is even wider for sixteenth century marriages than it is for the years 1600-
1760.  This may be an artifact since we have much less data for the years before 1540, especially for 
the richest tercile.  Consequently we have not tried here to explain this.  But there are sources that 
will allow us to extend the wills sample in greater depth back to marriages even of the 1430s which 
would allow an investigation of even late medieval fertility, and of whether there were even earlier 
changes in the fertility of the rich than we have identified here. 
 
Another area of potential further research is in the parallels between the change in fertility re-
gime in England in the late eighteenth century, and the well known regime change in France.  
Aggregate fertility decline in France preceded England by over a century.  This is surprising because 
if the fertility transition was a result of changing economic conditions, we would expect England, the 
crucible of the Industrial Revolution, to be first. One of us has collected similar wealth and fertility 
samples for four rural French villages, for deaths 1810-70, corresponding to fertility circa 1780-1850 
(Cummins 2009).  Before the fertility decline, as in England, there is a positive relationship between 
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wealth and net fertility.  However, as the fertility transition begins in France, in the 1780s, the 
relationship reverses even more rapidly than in England.  The richest villagers were the pioneers of 
family limitation. In rural France, where fertility was declining, the rich by the end of the period 
1810-70 display fertility 38% lower than that of the poor (Cummins 2009, 15).  Why did France 
experience this accelerated change in the relationship between wealth and fertility? 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 While there is still much work to be done on the precise mechanisms and causes, we demon-
strate above that pre-industrial fertility patterns did not survive unchanged in England until marriag-
es of the 1870s as has been conventionally believed.  Instead there was an important and rapid 
change in fertility patterns by wealth for marriages formed 1760-1800.  Up until then the richest 
English men were producing more than 4 surviving children at a time when men in general pro-
duced only 2.5 surviving children.  Within a generation the fertility of the rich fell to be no greater 
than, and perhaps less, that of the general population.  A Demographic Revolution thus accompa-
nied the Industrial Revolution.  Now united temporally, the two events may also be more plausibly 
linked causally. 
 
 
Appendix – imputing missing values 
 
 In forming the data base of fertility, estimated wealth at death, estimated dates of birth, and 
estimated dates of first marriage, we had to assign values in a number of cases where data was 
missing: birth, and marriage dates, area of land holding, numbers of children (where only a partial 
count was given).  
 
1. Replacing missing girls pre 1580 
 
 In the earliest wills, those before 1580, the ratio of sons to daughters is far above 1, so some 
daughters are clearly missing.   This is probably because married girls got their share of the bequest 
at the time of marriage, and so are not mentioned in the wills.  To inflate the reported family size to 
an estimate of the correct size the number of daughters reported was multiplied in these early years 
by an inflation factor.  Numbers of girls were multiplied by adjustment factors that make the 
boy/girl ratio the same as 1600-99 for the same type of location: countryside, town or London. 
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TABLE A.1 HERE 
 
2. Imputing numbers of children  
 
In some cases we only have partial information on the numbers of surviving children a testator 
has, such as that he has at least two children.  We impute the likely numbers of children in the way 
shown in table 2.  Since average family sizes were greater in the countryside than in towns, and 
greater in towns than in London, we did the imputation separately for each location.  Since average 
family sizes also changed over time we estimated these numbers for each of three periods: 1580-
1799, 1800-59, and 1859-1914.  Column 3, for example, shows the average numbers of children in 
families with at least 1 child for each location and time period.  The cells were left blank if there 
were fewer than 4 families observed in that cell.  Where we know, for example, just that a testator 
had at least 1 child in the years 1500-1799, then he was imputed 3.63 children if he lived in the 
countryside.  For London where we had to impute child numbers and the cell in the table was blank, 
we moved to the cell above for the imputation.   
 
TABLE A.2 HERE 
 
3. Imputing testators birth dates 
 
 As table A.3 shows for a large number of testators we are able to assign them a birth date, 
marriage date, or age at first child by linking them to the censuses of 1841 and later, or by linking 
them to parish registers of baptisms and marriages.  This linkage is more successful for men with 
unusual names, or those who were married and had children (since then we have multiple checks on 
whether they are properly equated with the person in the parish records).   
 
TABLE A.3 HERE 
 
 With these direct linkages of men to birth, marriage and first child dates we impute birth dates 
for all the men in our sample without direct information through the following regression  
 
AGE AT WILL = 52.40 + 7.99DAGED+0.868N +7.56DCHILD>21 -  9.52DCHILD<21 + 
4.88DGRANDCHILD –  3.94DSINGLE + 5.75DWIDOWER – 7.15DPARENT + 
4.56DNEPH - 2.47DSIB – 3.08DLON + 6.38DLON1800 – 1.55DTOWN + 1.15DFARM – 
3.34D1500 – 0.35D1650 + 1.42D1750 + 1.27D1800 + 4.56D1830 
                 n = 1,962, R2 = 0.52 
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DAGED = indicator testator noting he is “aged”, “ancient” or equivalent  
N = number of surviving children 
DCHILD>21 = indicator for at least one child known to be more than 21  
DCHILD<21 = indicator for at least one child known to be less than 21 
DGRANDCHILD = indicator for at least one known grandchild 
DSINGLE = indicator for testator never married 
DWIDOWER = indicator for testator widower 
DPARENT = indicator for at least one parent known to be alive 
DNEPH = indicator for a living niece or nephew 
DSIB = indicator for a living sibling 
DLON = indicator for residence in London 
DLON1800 = indicator for residence in London 1800 or later 
DTOWN = indicator for testator resident in a town (including London) 
DFARM = indicator for a testator living on a farm 
D1500, D1650, D1750, D1800, D1830 = indicators for years of death 1500-1649, 1650-1699, 1750-
1799, 1800-1829, 1830-1914 
 
 The fit of this expression, as measured by the R2, is good.  From this expression we estimate the 
date of birth of all testators without direct information on this as the will date – the estimated age at 
the will.  For some wills we only have a probate date.  To estimate the age at the will in this case we 
use the average gap between the dates of wills and the dates of probate, 2 years, to derive an esti-
mate of age at the will. 
 
 The parish records also allow us to calculate the average age at first marriage for men and their 
wives. This data is summarized by period in table A.4.  The average age here is calculated for the 
first marriage of testators, and for marriages for women not known to be have been married before.  
For testators the age at first marriage is remarkably stable over time, at around 28 years.  For com-
parison the average age of men in bachelor/spinster marriages from Wrigley, Davies, Oppen and 
Schofield (1997) (hereafter WDOS) is also shown.  Famously WDOS show a decline in the age of 
marriage for men from 27.5 years in the 17th century to 25.1 years in 1800-37.  For most of this 
period the testators thus tend to be older than the grooms in the reconstituted parishes.  Similarly 
the wives’ ages are shown.  Wives averaged only 24 at marriage, with again no trend over time.  
Again there is no sign of the downwards trend observed in WDOS.  Finally the gap between mens’ 
and womens’ ages at marriages for the testators is 3.8 years, compared to 1.6 years for the popula-
tion as a whole. 
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TABLE A.4 HERE 
 
 The stability of the marriage age for male testators means that we can assign marriage dates of 
the date of birth plus 28 years throughout the sample where a marriage date is not directly observed.  
 
 
4.  Imputing Land Areas 
 
 In 60 percent of the cases where land was bequeathed, the area of the land was not indicated.  
To infer the area for these wills we estimated for cases where area was given, that area as a function 
of other features of the will.  In all cases we used the number of houses bequeathed, the number of 
parishes the land was described as lying in, an indicator for the literacy of the testator, an indicator 
for whether the testator lived in a town, an indicator of whether the person engaged in farming, and 
indicators for each occupational group.  Where the probate value was given this was also included, 
where not the total of goods and cash bequeathed.  The functional form that best fit the observed 
cases was chosen by experiment.  Thus the estimated expression was  
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where SQRTHOUSE was the square root of the number of houses left, LPAR the logarithm of the 
number of parishes the land was in, SQRTPROBATE the square root of the net probate or duty 
value of the estate (real absolute values), 0 otherwise, SQRTCASHGDS the square root of the 
absolute value of cash and stock bequeathed (real values) (when probate or duty values not availa-
ble), 0 otherwise, DLIT an indicator for a literate testator, DLITUNKNOWN an indicator for 
someone whose literacy is unknown, DTOWN an indicator for a town dweller, DFARMER an 
indicator for someone engaged in farming, D1700 an indicator for a probate year of 1700-99, D1800 
an indicator for a probate year of 1800 or later, and OCCUPi  indicators for the six occupational 
groups defined above.  DFARM was set to one if the testator left farm animals or grain in the will, 
or left farm implements. 
 
CASHGDS was constructed as was constructed using the actual cash bequests in the will nor-
malized by the average price level in each decade (with the 1630s as the base).  To this was added the 
value of the stock left calculated using a standard set of values normalized to the 1630s: horses £5, 
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cattle £4, sheep £0.5, pigs £2, wheat (bu.) £0.21, barley/malt (bu.) £0.10, oats (bu.) £0.07, 
peas/beans (bu.) £0.12, silver spoons £0.375, gold rings £1.   
 
The fitted coefficients for this regression are shown in table A3.  The R2 of these regressions 
was 0.38, suggesting that we can explain nearly forty percent of the variance of land areas with these 
controls.  The median land area where the area was greater than 0 was 7 acres, the median estimated 
area was 9.1 acres (the means were respectively 27.8 and 31.2 acres).  
 
TABLE A.5 HERE 
 
 
5.  Imputing Probate Values 
 
 Before 1858 there are many cases where we have no direct information on the value of the 
personalty from the probate or the duty declaration.  Instead we have the gifts of cash and goods in 
the will, as well as real estate values and other characteristics of the testator.  To get all valuations on 
a uniform basis we estimate real probate values from real cash and goods values, and the other 
characteristics of testators.  The estimating equation is  
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Table A.6 shows the estimated coefficients for this regression, where the median regression is 
used.  The Pseudo-R2 is 0.31.  The main variable which matters in the regression is CASHGDS, the 
real value of goods and cash bequeathed.  A regression with only this variable has a Pseudo-R2 of 
0.29.   If OLS is used on the whole expression the R2 is an even more impressive 0.62.  However, the 
problem with the OLS estimation is that the range of probate values in the sample is very skewed, 
ranging from £0 to £78,482 with a median of only £133.  The OLS fit is thus dominated by fitting 
the high probate values, while we are much more concerned about correctly fitting probate values to 
people at the bottom end of the distribution.  The median estimator which relies on minimizing 
absolute rather than squared deviations is thus more appropriate.  An alternative technique which is 
used above is to take the log of the dependent variable (land area or real estate value), but here we 
run into problems of both 0 and negative values for CASHGDS and PROBATE. 
 
TABLE A.6 HERE 
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6.  Imputing All Real Estate 
 
Where the land area can be estimated, and the number and kind of houses is also approximated, 
then the value of real estate is the number of each type of asset (houses in the country, houses in 
town, houses in London, mansions (country), and other buildings or physical assets (mills, boats), 
and land multiplied by an appropriate price index.   
 
In some cases, however, we have no information on real estate from the will.  All that may be 
know is the probated value of the personalty of the estate, or the duty band for the purposes of 
estate taxation.  This would be, for example, because all assets, unspecified, were left to the wife.  
Here we infer real estate values in a two step procedure.  First we estimate whether there was any 
real estate through a logit regression.  Using a sample of cases where we know the presence or 
absence of real estate in the estate we estimate the likelihood that there was real estate as a function 
of other observable characteristics: what type of will was it (PCC is an indicator for a Prorogative 
Court of Canterbury will, PNONCUP an indicator for a nuncupative (spoken) will), what period was 
it, what was the probate value, was the testator literate or of unknown literacy, where did they dwell, 
and what was their occupation.  These estimates are shown in table A.6.  The dependent variable is 1 
if there is no real estate, 0 otherwise.  Unfortunately the pseudo R2 of this regression is only 0.08.  It 
is not possible to estimate well from the observed characteristics of testators whether or not they 
owned real estate. 
TABLE A.7 HERE 
 
 For cases where we assign real estate we estimate its value from the coefficients given in table 
A.8, which estimates the log of property value from observed characteristics of testators when it is 
known property was bequeathed.  The R2 of this estimation is much better at 0.31. 
 
TABLE A.8 HERE 
 
However, the overwhelming majority of cases in which we have to infer whether there was any 
real estate come after 1780, when the probate documents begin to list an estimated probate value.  
As the second column of table A.9 shows, in these years real estate was declining as a component of 
the total value of assets bequeathed, looking at all wills with complete information.  By 1860-1915 
real estate was only 21 percent of the value of all bequests.  Thus even those wills where we have 
only the personalty values directly should give a reasonable guide to the total value of the bequest.  
The third column shows what fraction of wills where we know of any real estate had some real 
estate of any kind.  In all cases, in a majority of wills, there is no real estate bequeathed.  The last 
column of table A.9 shows for those wills where there is land what the share of the land value is to 
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the total value of the bequest.  Again, while our imputation is imperfect here also, land is always a 
third or less on average of the bequest in such cases, so the extra error from this imputation is not 
too great. 
 
TABLE A.9 HERE 
 
 Table A.10 summarizes our data by the degree of imputation of wealth components that is 
required.  The data is ranged in a rough scale of quality.  The best wills are those where we have 
both the probate values and details of the real estate.  The poorest imputations are for wills where 
we have to estimate whether or not there is real estate, and then also the value of the real estate. 
 
TABLE A.10 HERE 
 
 To test how well we are doing in imputing wealth where we have incomplete information, table 
A.11 shows the median wealth of testators compared to their status/occupational class for each type 
of wealth imputation.  For the first four imputations of wealth the rankings of the different sta-
tus/occupational classes are very similar in terms of median estimated wealth.  Only for the last 
group, where we infer real estate from probate values and other indicators, do the wealth rankings 
seem less consistent. 
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Figure 1: Net fertility trends in England, 1540s-1910s 
 
 
 
Source: Wrigley and Schofield, 1981, 528-9, table A3, Wrigley, 1969, 196, Table 5.16. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Net Fertility by Social Class, Married Men, Marriages 1851-86 
 
 
 
Notes:  The Occupational Class scale here is that of T.H.C Stevenson. The classes I, professional and upper 
classes, e.g. doctors and commercial clerks, II, intermediate (e.g. farmers and shop keepers), III (skilled 
workmen, IV, workmen of undetermined skills (e.g. fishermen) and V, the unskilled.    
 
Source: General Registrar's Office, 1923, Part II, p. xcvii.  
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Figure 3:  The Geography of the Wills Sample 
 
 
Source: Great Britain Historical GIS, 2009. 
 
 
Figure 4:  Proportion of Men with Surviving Wills, Suffolk 1500-1702 
 
 
 
Notes:  The dashed line shows the share of men with wills reporting their occupation.  The smaller 
share 1640-59 is a result of the interregnum elimination of local ecclesiastical courts 1652-60. 
Source:  Clark, Cummins and Smith (2010).  
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Figure 5:  Net marital fertility by wealth decile, pre and post 1830 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Wealth by Age, Probates before and after 1830 
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Figure 7:  Net Fertility by Terciles, probate cohorts, 1500-1914 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Net Fertility by Terciles, marriage cohorts, 1500-1879 
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Figure 9:  Net Fertility Differences, Top minus Bottom Tercile, 1500-1879 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Fraction Never Married, by wealth decile, deaths 1500-1830 and 1830-59 
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Figure 11:  Share of testators in each wealth tercile, by marriage cohort 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Absolute and Relative Wealth and Net Fertility, marriage cohorts before 1800 
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Figure 13:  Chances of no surviving child by wealth decile, ever married men 
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Table 1: Summary of the Wills Data 
 
 
Period 
(death) 
 
 
N 
 
Median 
Assets 
(£ 1630) 
 
 
Minimum 
Assets 
(£ 1630) 
 
 
Maximum 
Assets 
(£ 1630) 
 
 
Median 
Asset 
Income 
(£ 1630) 
 
 
Average 
Age at 
Death 
       
1500-49 475 72 -36 4,873 3.64 52.0 
1550-99 1,071 88 -40 268,313 4.35 50.5 
1600-49 2,827 144 -39 25,328 7.66 53.6 
1650-99 1,295 175 -41 14,772 8.85 56.6 
1700-49 1,761 211 -218 21,367 9.20 58.0 
1750-99 2,019 317 -12 271,258 12.40 60.0 
1800-49 2,385 338 -14 137,382 11.24 63.4 
1850-1914 2,404 426 0 203,498 12.27 65.8 
       
Note:  All prices deflated to those of 1630-9.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Social Status, Assets and Literacy, pre 1800 deaths 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Social group 
 
 
N 
 
 
Average 
assets (£) 
 
 
%  
literate 
 
Ave Age 
at Death 
 
Gentry 431 804 0.90 56.7 
Merchants/Professionals 525 354 0.90 54.8 
Farmers 2,661 304 0.59 58.5 
Traders 771 242 0.69 55.1 
Craftsmen 1,343 154 0.68 55.8 
Husbandmen 1,711 83 0.43 55.4 
Laborers /Servants 
 
275 42 0.37 52.4 
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Table 3:  Social Status, Assets and Average Age, post 1800 deaths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Social group 
 
 
N 
 
 
Average 
assets 
(£) 
 
 
Ave Age at 
Death 
 
Ave Age at 
Death 
 
Gentry/Independent 462 1,160 0.90 67.3
Merchants/Professionals 696 610 0.96 64.5
Farmers 1,069 465 0.75 66.6
Traders 827 328 0.89 61.6
Craftsmen 835 304 0.88 64.3
Husbandmen 361 181 0.69 65.0
Laborers/Servants 
 
250 150 0.52 
 
64.8 
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Table 4:  Net Fertility of the Top versus the Bottom Tercile 
 
 
Notes:  Because numbers of surviving children is a count variable the regression was estimated as a 
negative binomial.  The estimated coefficients thus have to be exponentiated to get the fertility levels 
by asset class.  ** = statistically significant at the 1% level, * = statistically significant at the 5% level 
 
  
 
Marriage 
period 
 
 
Observations 
 
Coefficient 
Estimate 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
     
1500-19 272 0.554** 0.159 74 
1520-39 240 0.749** 0.163 111 
1540-59 411 0.574** 0.106 78 
1560-79 708 0.482** 0.071 62 
1580-99 1,100 0.417** 0.054 52 
     
1600-19 1,253 0.456** 0.056 58 
1620-39 597 0.234** 0.079 26 
1640-59 597 0.317** 0.083 37 
1660-79 583 0.393** 0.084 48 
1680-99 649 0.282** 0.081 33 
     
1700-19 814 0.345** 0.074 41 
1720-39 946 0.397** 0.072 49 
1740-59 778 0.337** 0.082 40 
1760-79 799 0.153 0.079 17 
1780-99 1,026 0.139* 0.068 15 
     
1800-19 1,067 0.086 0.075 9 
1820-39 745 -0.112 0.083 -11 
1840-59 785 0.005 0.080 1 
1860-79 457 0.077 0.117 8 
1880-99 85 -0.080 0.322 -8 
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Table 5: Wealth, Status and Literacy as competing fertility determinants 
 
  
 
 
Marriages 
1500-1799 
 
 
Coefficient 
  
 
 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
 
Marriages 
1800-1914  
 
 
Coefficient 
  
 
 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
          
Wealth Decile 1 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Wealth Decile 2 0.089 0.040 0.081 0.101 
Wealth Decile 3 0.167 0.039 -0.059 0.108 
Wealth Decile 4 0.255 0.040 -0.022 0.100 
Wealth Decile 5 0.312 0.040 -0.051 0.103 
Wealth Decile 6 0.302 0.040 -0.030 0.102 
Wealth Decile 7 0.388 0.040 0.010 0.100 
Wealth Decile 8 0.422 0.041 0.008 0.099 
Wealth Decile 9 0.471 0.041 -0.015 0.095 
Wealth Decile 10 0.603 0.043 0.106 0.089 
      
Laborers, Servants -0.013 0.053 0.127 0.132 
Husbandmen 0.053 0.029 0.285 0.123 
Craftsmen 0.093 0.031 0.237 0.108 
Traders 0.014 0.036 0.181 0.108 
Yeomen, farmers 0.092 0.027 0.206 0.109 
Merchants, professionals -0.012 0.042 0.164 0.110 
Gentlemen -0.071 0.043 0.026 0.118 
      
Literate -0.013 0.020 0.089 0.067 
      
Farm residence 0.085 0.021 0.067 0.077 
Town residence -0.068 0.020 -0.084 0.043 
London residence -0.409 0.035 -0.149 0.121 
          
N 8,972   2,033   
          
Note:  For occupation/social status the missing category are those without a reported occupation or 
status.   
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Table A1: Numbers of sons and daughters in wills, and inflation factors used before 1580 
 
 
Place 
 
Probate 
Period 
 
n 
 
Average  
boys 
 
 
Average 
girls 
 
Inflation 
factor for 
girls 
      
Countryside 1500-49 289 1.77 1.27 1.33 
Countryside 1550-79 387 1.61 1.33 1.16 
Countryside 1580-99 419 1.60 1.50 1 
Countryside 1600-99 3,317 1.41 1.35 1 
Countryside 1700-99 2,110 1.24 1.14 1 
Countryside 1800-58 1,496 1.43 1.36 1 
      
Town 1500-49 115 1.47 0.96 1.53 
Town 1550-79 63 1.24 1.32 1 
Town 1580-99 108 0.90 0.96 1 
Town 1600-99 749 1.32 1.32 1 
Town 1700-99 968 1.13 1.09 1 
Town 1800-58 645 1.30 1.16 1 
      
London 1500-49 98 .55 .55 1 
London 1550-79 61 .62 .74 1 
London 1580-99 37 .49 .32 1 
London 1600-99 625 .69 .79 1 
London 1700-99 647 .62 .70 1 
London 1800-58 164 .91 .95 1 
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Table A2:  Average numbers of children for families meeting the condition “children ≥ n” 
 
 
Place 
 
 
Period 
 
≥ 1 
 
≥ 2 
 
≥ 3 
 
≥ 4 
 
≥ 5 
 
≥ 6 
 
≥ 7 
 
≥ 8 
          
Countryside 1580-1799 3.63 4.10 4.76 5.47 6.20 7.08 7.90 8.81 
Countryside 1800-59 4.01 4.52 5.22 5.92 6.73 7.44 8.24 9.10 
Countryside Post 1859 3.50 4.26 5.03 5.85 6.49 7.35 7.86 9.00 
          
Town 1580-1799 3.41 3.97 4.70 5.40 6.22 6.98 7.88 8.88 
Town 1800-59 3.79 4.44 5.04 5.76 6.45 7.22 8.09 9.35 
Town Post 1859 3.32 3.90 4.69 5.41 6.21 6.95 7.82 9.00 
          
London 1580-1799 2.48 3.27 4.28 5.14 6.06 6.86 7.57 8.14 
London 1800-59 3.06 3.79 4.39 4.98 6.17 6.50 7.75 - 
London Post 1859 3.25 4.00 5.00 - - - - - 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3: Birth Information 
 
 
Group 
 
 
N 
Birth date also 
N 
   
Birth date 1,112 - 
Marriage date 1,132 451 
Age at first child 1,223 506 
At least one of above 
 
2,138 - 
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Table A.4:  Average Testators’ and Wives’ Ages at First Marriage 
 
 
Period of 
marriage 
 
N 
 
Average age 
at marriage 
(testators) 
 
WDOS 
(bachelor 
/spinster 
marriages) 
 
 
N 
 
Average age 
at marriage 
(wives) 
 
 
WDOS 
(bache-
lor/spinster 
marriages) 
       
1500-99 263 27.5 - 80 24.1 - 
1600-99 100 28.0 27.5 73 23.2 25.7 
1700-99 246 27.5 26.4 190 24.2 25.0 
1800-37 135 28.4 25.1 88 24.5 23.6 
1838-1914 94 28.2 - 78 23.7 - 
       
 
Sources: Wrigley et al., 1997, table 5.7, p. 149 (WDOS).  International Genealogical Index. 
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Table A5: Estimating Land Areas 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Estimated values 
Cash 
 
 
Standard Errors 
 
   
Constant 1.198 .144 
D1700 -.095 .088 
D1800 -.370** .117 
DPCC -.283* .141 
SQRTHOUSE .252** .052 
LPAR 1.18** .105 
SQRTPROBATE .0104** .002 
SQRTCASHGDS .0295** .004 
DLIT .277** .090 
DLITUNKNOWN .219* .108 
DTOWN -0.280** .097 
DFARM .258** .088 
   
Laborer -1.241** .274 
Husbandman -.544** .159 
Craftsman -.508** .165 
Tradesman -.169 .184 
Yeoman/Farmer .412** .138 
Merchant/Professional -.212 .207 
Gentleman .548* .193 
   
R2 0.38  
N 1,261  
   
 
Notes:  ** = statistically significant at the 1% level, * = statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table A.6: Estimating Real Probate Values 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Estimated coeffi-
cient values 
 
 
Standard Errors 
   
Constant 9.15 6.93 
DPCC 233.2** 5.80 
DNONCUP 14.07 18.13 
d1500-99 -6.63 16.27 
d1700-99 21.87* 9.29 
d1800-59 -4.34 10.06 
d1860-1914 310.3** 20.35 
CASHGDS 1.096** 0.001 
Real Estate 0.046** 0.002 
DDUTY 26.94** 9.10 
DLIT 2.72 4.20 
DLITUNKNOWN 3.36 5.17 
DLON -46.63** 6.70 
DTOWN 5.10 4.13 
DFARM 9.15 4.93 
Laborer -11.4 10.13 
Husbandman -4.6 7.35 
Craftsman 7.0 6.94 
Tradesman 52.5** 7.47 
Yeoman/Farmer 11.8 6.92 
Merchant/Professional 93.3** 9.47 
Gentleman 97.3** 8.33 
   
R2 0.31  
N 2,582  
   
 
Notes:  ** = statistically significant at the 1% level, * = statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table A.7: Estimated likelihood of absence of real estate 
        
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Estimated coeffi-
cient values 
 
 
Standard Errors 
Constant 0.380    0.157      
DPCC -.26249    .1359     
DNONCUP 1.6070** .5743      
1500-99 -.7515834    .4090     
1700-59 -.2666    .1991 
1760-1859 -.8264**     .1550     
1860-1915 .7801**     .1355      
SQRT(probate or duty value) -.00625**    .00163     
DDUTY .4341**     .1169      
Literate -.2459    .0945     
Unknown Literacy .1887    .1125      
Town dweller .0575    .0819      
London dweller 1.0378** .1435 
Farm dweller .1880         .1116      
Laborer -.4339*    .1979     
Husbandman -.6218**    .1608     
Craftsman -.9704**    .1507     
Tradesman -.7797**    .1546     
Yeoman/Farmer -.8950**    .1555     
Merchant/Professional -.4905** .1664     
Gentleman -1.0216**    .1772     
   
Pseudo R2 0.08  
N 4,353  
   
 
Notes:  ** = statistically significant at the 1% level, * = statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
  
 43
Table A.8: Estimating Real Estate Value 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Estimated coeffi-
cient values 
 
 
Standard Errors 
Constant 4.23 0.10 
DPCC 0.040 0.066 
1500-99 -.7155** .219 
1700-59 .3318** .123 
1760-1859 .5060** .098 
1860-1914 1.424** .0824 
SQRT(PROBATE) 0.0051** 0.0008 
DDUTY -0.045 0.079 
DLON 0.698** 0.093 
DTOWN 0.295** 0.045 
DFARM 0.004 0.060 
Literate 0.182** 0.052 
Unknown Literacy 0.330** 0.063 
Laborer -0.109 0.124 
Husbandman -0.129 0.101 
Craftsman 0.145 0.093 
Tradesman 0.093 0.097 
Yeoman/Farmer 0.257 0.095 
Merchant/Professional 0.119 0.106 
Gentleman 0.486** 0.103 
   
R2 0.31  
N 2,636  
   
 
Notes:  ** = statistically significant at the 1% level, * = statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table A.9:  The Range of Wealth Data Types in the Wills by period   
 
 
Asset 
Quality 
 
Probate, real 
estate, land 
area 
 
Cash, real 
estate, 
land area 
 
Probate, 
real estate 
land area 
unknown 
 
 
Cash, real 
estate 
land area 
unknown 
 
 
Probate 
 
real estate 
unknown 
 
All 
   
1500-99 16 883 10 459 2 1,629 
1600-99 486 1,953 142 1,185 103 4,230 
1700-99 486 2,010 144 656 345 4,253 
1800-59 1,439 249 311 100 635 2,782 
post 1860 1,093 5 51 6 614 1,771 
       
Total 3,520 5,100 658 2,406 1,699 14,665 
   
 
 
 
Table A.10:  Share of Real Estate and Farmland in Assets  
 
 
Asset 
Quality 
 
Average share  
of Real Estate 
values in 
bequest totals 
(all wills) 
 
 
Bequests with 
real estate as a 
share of all 
bequest 
(all wills) 
 
Average 
share  of 
Farmland 
in bequests 
(wills with 
land) 
 
  
1500-99 0.12 0.30 0.29 
1600-99 0.25 0.43 0.33 
1700-99 0.35 0.36 0.31 
1800-59 0.36 0.34 0.28 
post 1860 0.21 0.22 0.27 
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Table A.11:  Median Wealth by Asset Quality   
 
 
Asset Quality 
 
Probate, real 
estate, land 
area 
 
Cash, 
real 
estate, 
land area
 
Probate, 
real estate, 
land area 
unknown 
 
 
Cash, real 
estate, land 
area 
unknown 
 
 
Probate, real 
estate un-
known 
   
Gentry 957 797 1272 1056 683 
Merchants/  
Professionals 676 318 1217 577 277 
Farmers 343 207 469 396 443 
Traders 307 238 477 338 259 
Craftsmen 232 124 358 215 319 
Husbandmen 127 64 194 139 120 
Laborers/Servants 
 
110 
 
34 
 
184 
 
67 
 
176 
 
 
